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Power, Predistribution, and Social Justice 1 
 
Abstract:  
The idea of predistribution has the potential to offer a valuable and distinctive 
approach to political philosophers, political scientists, and economists, in thinking 
about social justice and the creation of more egalitarian economies. It is also an idea 
that has drawn the interest of politicians of the left and centre-left, promising an 
alternative to traditional forms of social democracy. But the idea of predistribution is 
not well understood, and stands in need of elucidation. This article explores ways of 
drawing the conceptual and normative distinction between predistribution and 
redistribution, examining those general categories when considering the roles of public 
services and fiscal transfers, and looking at the ways in which government policies can 
empower and disempower different individuals and groups within the economy. This 
article argues that the most initially plausible and common-sensical ways of drawing 
the distinction between predistributive and redistributive public policies collapse when 
put under analytical pressure. It concludes that the distinction between predistribution 
and redistribution is best seen in terms of the aims or effects of policies rather than a 
deeper division of policy types, and argues that, once seen in those terms, 
predistribution is a central concern of social justice. 
 
 
1.! Introduction: Predistribution, Redistribution, and Social Justice 
In recent years the idea of ‘predistribution’ has received a good deal of attention, both in 
academic discussions of inequality and social justice, and within the world of practical 
politics. And yet this idea of predistribution is not always used clearly, and much needs 
 
1 For helpful and stimulating comments and questions, I am grateful to audiences at the McCoy Family 
Center for Ethics in Society at Stanford University, at the Center for Ethics and Public Affairs at Tulane 
University, at the Harvard-Fudan-NYUAD Conference on Justice at Fudan University, Shanghai, at the 
Social Justice Centre at Concordia University, at the Universities of Jerusalem, Belgrade, Minho, and 
Sydney, and at McGill University, UCL, and the Universidad de Chile. I am also grateful to the Fabian 
Society, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung of the German Social Democratic Party, and the Chifley Research 
Foundation of the Australian Labor Party for opportunities to discuss ideas of predistribution with 
political audiences. Thanks in particular to Pablo Aguayo Westwood, Daniel Attas, Tongdong Bai, 
Juliana Bidadanure, Jim Chalmers, Lindsey Chambers, Prithviraj Datta, Avner de-Shalit, Patrick 
Diamond, Peter Dietsch, Steven Durlauf, Bela Egyed, Marc Fleurbaey, Pablo Gilabert, Joe Guinan, Jacob 
Hacker, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Ben Jackson, James Johnson, Liam Kennedy, Hélène Landemore, Ben 
Laurence, Ted Lechterman, Dominique Leydet, Désirée Lim, Fernando Lizárraga, Rocío Lorca Ferreccio, 
Roberto Merrill, Henning Meyer, Ed Miliband, Oded Na’aman, Dai Oba, Kristi Olson, Rachel Reeves, 
Jonathan Riley, Mathias Risse, T. M. Scanlon, Shlomi Segall, Nicole Selamé Glena, Ania Skrzypek, 
Lucas Stanczyk, Isaac Stanley, Christine Sypnowich, Alan Thomas, Isabella Trifan, Laura Valentini, 
Daniel Weinstock, Stuart White, Karl Widerquist, Andrew Williams, and Bernardo Zacka for 
illuminating discussion of the issues with which this article is concerned. I also thank the journal’s 
anonymous referees for their extremely helpful suggestions. I am pleased to be able to acknowledge 
research support from the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF), in the form of a research 
fellowship on “Social Justice, Predistribution, and the Democratization of Capital”. 
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to be done to put the notion on a more secure footing. This essay aims to uncover, and 
then eradicate, various confusions about the idea of predistribution, putting the idea on a 
firmer footing, and thereby clearing the way for more productive future discussions of 
policies and institutions for addressing economic inequality. 
 
When political philosophers think about egalitarian public policy, and about what states 
need to do in order to deliver social and economic justice, their attention has most often 
naturally been drawn to questions of redistribution. They typically consider how states 
can create more equal outcomes through standard fiscal mechanisms, as when more 
advantaged members of society are taxed by the state, which then uses those fiscal 
flows to fund transfer payments and to provide public services. It is illustrative here 
that, when G. A. Cohen launched his powerful and influential critique of Rawls’s 
account of social justice, the totemic practical issue on which he focussed was the level 
of the top marginal rate of income taxation.2  
 
While this predominant concern with questions of redistribution as being central to 
thinking about justice and equality generally still remains, it is noteworthy that more 
recent work in political philosophy increasingly brings questions of predistribution to 
the fore. As T. M. Scanlon puts it in his 2018 book Why Does Inequality Matter?, 
“[a]nother way of promoting equality, or avoiding inequality, is through what has been 
called predistribution, that is to say, through the laws and policies that determine 
individuals' pretax incomes.”3 This shift of attention to the broader set of laws and 
policies that produce inequality aligns with a general broadening of concern with the 
normative assessment of a range of socioeconomic institutions, and away from an 
artificially circumscribed focus on only a particular subset of the ways in which 
institutions can either foster or reduce economic inequality.4 This broader focus could 
encompass, for example, concerns with minimum wage levels, or the regulation of trade 
unions and wage bargaining processes, as well as issues of financial and corporate 
regulation, the regulation of important sectors such as the housing or energy markets, 
 
2 G. A. Cohen, ‘Incentives, Inequality and Community’, Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake 
City, 1991), pp. 261-329, e.g. 263-4; G. A Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Harvard University 
Press, 2008), e.g. 27-86. 
3 T. M. Scanlon, Why Does Inequality Matter? (Oxford University Press, 2018), 102.  
4 See Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson, ‘The Promise of Predistribution’, Policy Network, 2012; Nick 
Pearce, ‘What Should Social Democrats Believe?’, Juncture 20.2 (2013), 101-110; Alan Thomas, 
Republic of Equals: Predistribution and Property-Owning Democracy, (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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and the use of national and local government procurement spending in shaping the 
structure of markets.5 
 
A similar broadening of concern can be seen in recent work by leading economists, with 
Joseph Stiglitz also using the language of predistribution to describe his 2016 proposals 
for “Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy”.6 As Stiglitz puts it in his 2019 
book, People, Power and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent, “If 
we succeed in making market incomes more equal, there is less of a burden on 
redistribution. This emphasis on pre-distribution is important. It highlights that getting a 
fairer distribution of income is not just a matter of redistribution, of taxing the rich to 
give to the more needy.”7 The idea here seems to be a straightforward one, at least at 
first acquaintance: predistribution is about the role of government in changing market 
outcomes, and thereby creating fairer distributive outcomes without the need for 
directly engaging in redistribution.8 Thomas Piketty, meanwhile, has stressed the need 
to pursue redistribution and predistribution in combination, with the two being 
“complementary, not substitutes,”9 while also questioning the conceptual distinction 
between the two categories: an issue that will be explored in detail in what follows here. 
 
5 Emily McTernan, Martin O’Neill, Christian Schemmel, and Fabian Schuppert, ‘If You Care About 
Social Equality You Want a Big State: Home, Work, Care and Social Egalitarianism’, Juncture, 23.2 
(2016), 138-44; Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill, ‘The Institutional Turn: Labour’s New Political 
Economy’, Renewal: a Journal of Social Democracy, 26.2, 2018, 5-16; Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill, 
The Case for Community Wealth Building, (Polity, 2019). 
6 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared 
Prosperity, (W. W. Norton & Company, 2015); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2018, ‘Weak economic 
recovery was down to flawed policies, not secular stagnation’, The Guardian, 29 August 2018. 
7 Joseph E. Stiglitz 2019, People, Power and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent 
(Allen Lane, 2019), 198. 
8 For concrete proposals for predistributive policies, see for example, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Isaac 
Stanley, Madeleine Gabriel, and Geoff Mulgan, Imagination Unleashed: Democratising the Knowledge 
Economy, (NESTA, 2019); Liam Kennedy, ‘The institution’s not for turning? Inequality, taxes and anti-
capitalism’, Renewal: a Journal of Social Democracy, 27.3 (2019), 51-59; Liam Kennedy, ‘Inequality: 
from redistribution to predistribution and beyond?’, Social Europe, 2 May 2019, available at 
<https://www.socialeurope.eu/inequality-socialisation/>; Paul Gregg, ‘The Potential and Limits of 
Predistribution in the UK: Tackling Inequality and Poverty’ in The Predistribution Agenda: Tackling 
Inequality and Supporting Sustainable Growth, (Policy Network, 2015), edited by Claudia Chwalisz and 
Patrick Diamond, 79-90; Anne Wren, ‘The Political Economy of the Service Transition: New Political 
Coalitions for Predistributive Strategies’, in Chwalisz and Diamond, op. cit., 222-234. For a somewhat 
dissenting voice, see Lane Kenworthy, ‘What’s Wrong with Predistribution’, Juncture, 20.2 (2013), 111-
17. 
9 Thomas Piketty, ‘Capital, Predistribution and Redistribution’ in Crooked Timber Seminar on Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Henry Farrell, 90–107. Available at 
<http://crookedtimber.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/piketty-final.pdf>. See also Martin O’Neill, 
‘Philosophy and Public Policy after Piketty’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 25.3 (2017), 343-375. 
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This increasing academic concern with predistribution runs parallel with developments 
in the world of practical politics. Traditional models of social democracy have come 
under pressure as support for welfare state institutions have weakened, leaving a 
scepticism about familiar forms of redistribution, together with a lack of clarity about 
what the most promising alternatives to such policies might be. Moreover, with 
runaway levels of inequality within the rich industrialised countries, it seems 
increasingly implausible that familiar forms of redistributive, tax-and-spend centre-left 
politics can any longer be adequate to the task of creating a more just and equitable 
economic settlement. The lack of clear ideas to animate a new centre-left vision of the 
role of the state has been associated, in many countries, with a fall in support for 
mainstream social democratic parties, as we see with the travails of parties such as the 
French Parti Socialiste, or the German SPD.10 
 
While the US Democratic Party has its own distinct history, placing it at some distance 
from the mainstream currents of global social democracy, ideas of predistribution have 
also gained some purchase within that party, especially on its more radical wing. A 
January 2019 New York Times article by Steven K. Vogel, a political scientist based at 
UC Berkeley, explains the economic policies at the centre of Senator Elizabeth 
Warren’s policy platform for her 2020 Presidential bid as itself being organised around 
an idea of predistribution. As the NY Times headline puts it, “Elizabeth Warren Wants 
to Stop Inequality Before It Starts: Redistribution is important, but comes too late”.11  
 
The idea of predistribution has therefore been seen as offering a way forward for 
progressive and social democratic parties of the left and centre-left, finding a way of 
moving beyond political strategies that seem to have run out of steam. Patrick Diamond 
and Claudia Chwalisz of the think tank Policy Network, which brings together social 
democratic parties across the globe, go so far as to describe predistribution as offering 
 
10 See Thomas Piketty, Capital et Idéologie (Éditions du Seuil, 2019); Stephanie Mudge, Leftism 
Reinvented: Western Parties from Socialism to Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018); 
Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: the Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso Books, 2014), 
Ashley Lavelle, The Death of Social Democracy: Political Consequences in the 21st Century (Ashgate, 
2008). 
11 Steven K. Vogel, ‘Elizabeth Warren Wants to Stop Inequality Before It Starts’, The New York Times, 3 
January 2019. 
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“a new governing prospectus for the centre-left”.12 The idea has, indeed, been taken up 
by politicians from a range of European social democratic parties, as well as by 
politicians from the Australian and New Zealand Labor Parties.13 Perhaps most 
famously, or notoriously, the idea of predistribution was invoked by former UK Labour 
leader Ed Miliband as a central organising theme of the Labour Party’s economic policy 
during his leadership, with a focus on reforms to corporate governance (with worker 
representation on boards) and government procurement practices (to drive up wages and 
incentivise private sector investment in skills development).14 Although the idea became 
somewhat muted in the run-up to the 2015 general election in the UK, the idea of 
emphasising underlying institutional changes to the economy, rather than relying on 
fiscal redistribution, has retained its currency as pointing a path forward in the 
achievement of more just societies in the decades after the end of the social democratic 
era.15 
 
Having given a sense of the relevant background, both intellectual and political, the aim 
of this article is to apply some analytical rigour to the idea of predistribution, and to 
offer a diagnosis of whether it really does describe a distinct and coherent set of 
policies, to be distinguished from the more familiar forms of redistribution that have 
traditionally been championed by the centre-left. Only by getting a clear sense of what 
may or may not be distinctive in the idea of predistribution, and, relatedly, whether 
there is a fundamental distinction between predistributive and redistributive forms of 
public policy, can we assess whether, as some of those mentioned above might believe, 
the idea of ‘predistribution’ could serve as an important organising idea for thinking 
about the future of egalitarian public policy. 
 
 
12 Claudia Chwalisz and Patrick Diamond, “Predistribution: A New Governing Prospectus for the Centre-
Left,” in The Predistribution Agenda: Tackling Inequality and Supporting Sustainable Growth, edited by 
Claudia Chwalisz and Patrick Diamond, (I. B. Tauris, 2015). 
13 See for example Jim Chalmers, ‘Labor and the Tools of Success’, in Not Dead Yet: What Future for 
Labor? by Mark Latham (Black Inc, 2013); and Penny Wong, ‘Australians Shouldn’t Have to Choose 
between Growth and Fairness’, The Guardian, 19 May 2014. 
14 See Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson, ‘Philosophical Foundations for ‘Good Capitalism’’, 
Renewal: a Journal of Social Democracy, 20.1, 2012, 20-32. 
15 Ed Miliband, ‘The Inequality Problem’, London Review of Books, 38 (3), 2016, 19-20. See also Eunice 
Goes, The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband: Trying but Failing to Renew Social Democracy 
(Manchester University Press, 2016), and Joe Guinan and Martin O’Neill, ‘The Institutional Turn: 
Labour’s New Political Economy’, Renewal, 26 (2), 2018, 5-16, esp. at 7. 
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I shall argue that there are considerable conceptual problems with most common ways 
in which the contours of the idea of predistribution have been articulated, not least 
because it is difficult to find an unproblematic way in which to distinguish between 
predistributive and redistributive forms of public policy. In establishing this claim, my 
approach will be somewhat dialectical, starting not from an abstract conceptual 
foundation, but encountering the idea of predistribution in media res, working through 
some of the initially plausible but ultimately unsuccessful ways that the idea has been 
presented. Nevertheless, I shall argue that it is possible to rescue the idea of 
predistribution from the conceptual quagmire into which it might be in danger of 
falling, if we look to reconstruct it – again in a somewhat dialectical fashion – by first 
challenging and then redrawing its boundaries. This reconstruction of the idea of 
predistribution allows us to lay out the idea of predistribution as an important strand in 
thinking about the potential of a more egalitarian political economy. While my 
discussion will touch upon the pre-history of predistribution, I begin with the recent 
history of the idea. 
 
2.! The Recent Conceptual History of Predistribution: Jacob Hacker on the 
‘Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class Democracy’ 
Although one can find one or two earlier uses of the term predistribution16, conceived as 
an alternative approach to standard forms of redistribution, the recent use of the term 
dates back to a 2011 paper delivered at the Progressive Governance Conference in Oslo 
by the political scientist Jacob Hacker, on ‘The Institutional Foundations of Middle-
Class Democracy’; Hacker has, since then, rightly come to be seen as the central and 
pre-eminent academic advocate of the idea of predistribution.17 In this article, Hacker is 
looking to draw on the lessons of his book co-authored with Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-
All Politics18, in terms of its implications for how progressive politicians should look to 
correct for the increasingly inegalitarian character of the economic settlement in the 
advanced industrial countries.19  
 
16 James Robertson, ‘The Future of Money: If We Want a Better Game of Life, We'll Have to Change the 
Scoring System’, Soundings, 31 (2005), 118-32 
17 Jacob S. Hacker, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Middle-Class Democracy,’ in Priorities for a New 
Political Economy: Memos to the Left, (Policy Network, 2011), 33-38. Hacker here is using the term 
‘middle-class’ in its sense in American English, rather than its sense in British English. 
18 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer – 
And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class, (Simon & Schuster, 2010). 
19 A caveat about my argumentative strategy: In this section and the two sections that follow, I shall put 
quite a degree of pressure on Hacker’s attempts to give more definite shape to the intuitive distinction 
 7 
 
Hacker introduces the idea of predistribution as one of three strands in his diagnosis of 
what had gone wrong in the past with regard to growing inequality, and therefore as an 
aspect of the economic situation “crucial for grasping – and overcoming – the 
challenges that progressives face today”.20 Here is his characterisation of the idea: 
 
“The first feature is the role of pre-distribution. When we think of government’s effects 
on inequality, we think of redistribution – government taxes and transfers that take from 
some and give to others. Yet many of the most important changes have been in what 
might be called “pre-distribution” – the way in which the market distributes its rewards 
in the first place. Policies governing financial markets, the rights of unions and the pay 
of top executives have all shifted in favour of those at the top … 
   
The moral of this story is that progressive reformers need to focus on market reforms 
that encourage a more equal distribution of economic power and rewards even before 
government collects taxes or pays out benefits. This is not just because pre-distribution 
is where the action is. It is also because excessive reliance on redistribution fosters 
backlash, making taxes more salient and feeding into the conservative critique that 
government simply meddles with “natural” market rewards.”21 (my italics) 
 
Hacker is giving us two reasons for switching our concern from redistribution to 
predistribution: (a) predistribution is simply of greater fundamental importance than 
redistribution, because it reflects more deep-seated features of how the economy 
functions – i.e. it is “where the action is”; and (b) notwithstanding the more 
fundamental nature of predistribution over redistribution, it is anyway the case that there 
are instrumental reasons to turn away from traditional redistributive policies, for such 
policies foster “backlash” and can be counter-productive in terms of feeding the kinds 
of conservative and anti-egalitarian political sentiments that undermine support for 
progressive or egalitarian politics. Let us call these the fundamental case for 
predistribution and the instrumental case. I take it that Hacker takes both considerations 
– fundamental and instrumental – to operate in tandem, presumably overdetermining his 
advice for centre-left politicians and political parties. 
 
 
between predistribution and redistribution. But this is not intended as criticism of Hacker per se: he has 
done a great deal to develop an important public policy agenda in this area, and his ways of articulating 
the conceptual distinction between these kinds of policies are valuable in pointing us towards intuitively 
appealing, if ultimately unstable, ways of thinking about these issues.   
20 Op. cit. note 13, 35. 
21 Op. cit. note 13, 35. 
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Before assessing the substance of either the fundamental or the instrumental case for 
predistribution, though, I want first to pause to ask whether this characterisation of 
predistribution can be seen as passing muster in terms of determinateness and 
coherence. Hacker’s characterisation of predistribution is that it is constituted by 
“market reforms that encourage a more equal distribution of economic power even 
before government collects taxes or pays out benefits.” (my italics) But it is not clear 
how we should understand that characterisation, once we begin to put some pressure on 
it. There are, in fact, two ways in which this characterisation might seem to be both 
confused and confusing, and hence two clear objections that one can make to it. I’ll call 
these the temporal objection and the Murphy-Nagel objection, and will take them in 
turn. 
 
Firstly, the temporal objection. If read in its literal sense, the talk of before and after 
with regard to the tax system simply does not stand up. It is not that economic activity 
somehow takes place within a discrete time period, with the government standing 
outside the economic domain while these processes take place, only stepping in at the 
end of each period, so to speak, in order to collect taxes and pay out benefits, so that a 
new discrete period of economic activity can then take place. Rather, economic activity 
is an endlessly ongoing process, with the government’s activities as both collector of 
taxes and payer of benefits a similarly continuous, if periodically modulating, 
constitutive part of that process. The temporal objection then, is that talk of ‘before’ and 
‘after’ with regard to government’s role in economic life, while it has a certain kind of 
brisk initial plausibility, is on further investigation merely mystifying.22 
 
A second objection takes a step back, allowing that this temporal language of ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ should not be read literally. One can grant that the distinction between 
economic activity and government tax-and-spend should not be understood in temporal 
terms, because the two are always temporally intertwined, while nevertheless thinking 
that there is an important distinction to be made between economic activity considered 
on its own terms, conceptually if not temporally prior to government intervention, and 
 
22 For a related discussion of the conceptual problems of temporal metaphors for thinking about the way 
that the state structures economic activity, see Martin O’Neill, ‘Free (and Fair) Markets without 
Capitalism: Political Values, Principles of Justice, and Property-Owning Democracy,’ in Martin O’Neill 
and Thad Williamson, eds., Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 
75-100, esp. 87-91. 
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the same activity taking place within the context of a regime of government tax-and-
spend activity. But even if the terrain here shifts from the temporal to the conceptual, a 
different variant of the same kind of problem remains.  
 
In their book The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, Liam Murphy and Thomas 
Nagel diagnose the conceptual errors embedded in the view they call ‘everyday 
libertarianism’.23 This is, in effect, the view that there is a domain of economic activity, 
free of government intervention, that has conceptual (if not temporal) priority over 
really existing economic activity that takes place in the presence of government tax-
and-spending. This “everyday libertarian” fallacy explains what goes wrong when an 
individual thinks of their pre-tax income as in some sense robustly all ‘theirs’, with 
government intervention through the tax system then conceptualised as the 
expropriation of something that would otherwise belong to them. As Murphy and Nagel 
point out, what counts as somebody’s property is itself defined by the full system of 
property rights, of which the tax system is a part. The tax system is not some alien 
extrusion into the property system, but a constitutive part of it. Moreover, given that an 
individual’s market earnings will typically depend on a background of legal, social and 
physical infrastructure – from contract-enforcement to public roads – which itself 
depends on the tax system, it is not as if there exists some kind of normatively 
privileged possible world in which we somehow can have the benefits of the tax system 
without being taxed, and against which we should set the normative benchmark of our 
property entitlements. 
 
Hence, what we might call the Murphy-Nagel objection to Hacker’s initial 
characterisation of predistribution is that there is something confused in talk of 
economic distributions “before government collects taxes or pays out benefits” even 
when that before is understood as indicating a kind of conceptual rather than temporal 
priority. The mystification may be of a slightly different kind, but it persists in moving 
 
23 Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). For critical discussion of Murphy and Nagel’s idea of ‘everyday libertarianism’, see Marc 
Fleurbaey, ‘Welfarism, Libertarianism, and Fairness in the Economic Approach to Taxation’, in Martin 
O’Neill and Shepley Orr, eds., Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives, (Oxford University Press, 2018), 
37-59; Geoffrey Brennan, ‘Striving for the Middle Ground: Taxation, Justice, and the State of Private 
Rights’, in O’Neill and Orr, op. cit., 60-80; and Laura Biron, ‘Taxing or Taking? Property Rhetoric and 
the Justice of Taxation’, in O’Neill and Orr, op. cit., 81-97. 
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from the temporal reading of the phrase to the conceptual reading. Moreover, there 
would be a odd tension in Hacker’s position if it were to need to make use of this kind 
of conceptual prioritisation of pre- tax-and-spend economic activity. For bear in mind 
that, in Hacker’s instrumental case for the shift in focus from redistribution to 
predistribution, his argument is that the backlash fostered by redistributive policies 
feeds into “the conservative critique that government meddles with “natural” market 
rewards”. In other words, the political psychology of redistribution, in which people 
resent the government’s apparent appropriation of ‘their’ pre-tax income is one that 
involves, and indeed reinforces, the conceptually muddled ‘everyday libertarian’ view 
to which Murphy and Nagel take exception. Given that Hacker’s instrumental objection 
to redistributive politics is that it feeds this muddled way of thinking about the 
relationship between government activity and economic rewards, it would therefore be 
odd if Hacker’s canonical characterisation of predistribution – conceived as an 
alternative strategy to familiar forms of redistribution – itself embedded its own version 
of this same kind of conceptual mistake.  
 
3.! A Better Account of Predistribution? Tax-and-Spend vs Market-Shaping 
Hacker gives a broader and less mystifying characterisation of predistribution in a 2013 
interview on “The Politics of Predistribution”: 
 
“[Predistribution] is a very basic idea. It is that government has an enormous range of 
ways in which it can shape the distribution of income and opportunity in a society that 
are distinct from simply taxing and providing benefits. […] (my italics) 
 
Markets are deeply shaped by government. And over the last generation markets have 
been shaped in ways that have benefited those at the top far more than those in the 
middle and bottom. If we are going to have an effective, progressive agenda for the 
future, we are going to have to think about how to use these ways in which government 
shapes markets to pursue progressive goals. By progressive goals I mean, first and 
foremost, broad growth in the economy that translates into social and economic gains 
for citizens across the income distribution.”24  (my italics) 
 
This is a happier, less problematic characterisation of the core of the idea of 
predistribution, given not in terms of what can be done before or after government tax-
and-spend, but instead putting things more simply in terms of what government can do 
(a) “to shape the distribution of income and opportunity” (b) “that are distinct from 
 
24 Jacob S. Hacker, Ben Jackson and Martin O’Neill, ‘Interview: the Politics of Predistribution’, Renewal, 
21 (2/3), 54-64, at 54. 
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simply taxing and providing benefits”. The characterisation of predistributive policies 
simply as being distinct from, rather than either temporally or conceptually prior, 
dismisses the two kinds of worries discussed previously. We seem therefore to have 
here at least a provisionally satisfactory characterisation of the idea of predistribution.  
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting a problem with talk of the “ways in which it can shape 
the distribution of income and opportunity in a society that are distinct from simply 
taxing and providing benefits” when considered at face value, which is that there is 
nothing in such a characterisation that captures the idea of predistribution as a 
substantively progressive or egalitarian kind of policy. Consider the case of what one 
might call “inegalitarian predistribution”, using a semi-imaginary country that I’ll call 
Ukania, as a way of illustrating the distinction between formal and substantive 
understandings of predistribution: 
 
The Case of Ukania 
Ukania has strong labour unions and a relatively compressed income distribution. 
Organised labour is politically strong when negotiating with employers, keeping the 
capital share of national income relatively low. After a general election, a radically anti-
egalitarian, ‘pro-business’ government enacts a range of economic policies, including 
reducing both current and investment spending in public services, and reducing the top 
rate of income tax (with this latter policy being the one to receive most attention from 
Ukania’s political philosophers25). But at least as important as these changes to the tax-
and-spend regime, the government also undertakes a number of measures that we might 
describe as instances of (formal) predistribution, which are distinct from changes to 
taxation or benefits. For example, the government makes it more difficult for workers to 
take industrial action, thereby weakening the bargaining power of labour unions, and 
makes it easier for employers to sack workers, thereby making individual workers more 
fearful of their economic security and less liable to indulge in industrial militancy. The 
effect of these (formally) predistributive policies is to reshape the power dynamics of 
the labour market, thereby attenuating the income distribution as managers and 
entrepreneurs begin to find their economic rewards accelerating away from those of 
 
25 In the vein of the discussion in G. A. Cohen’s work on inequality, incentives and marginal tax rates. 
See op. cit. note 2. 
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ordinary workers, while also leading to a shift in the balance between labour and capital 
in their shares of the distribution of national income. 
 
The case of Ukania shows that there is nothing in the formal idea of non-tax-and-spend 
government interventions in market regulation that necessarily aligns with progressive 
or egalitarian goals. Plenty that a government might do that is not tax-and-spend, from 
weakening vacation entitlements to lowering minimum wage levels, could lessen the 
income or opportunities of those people within the economy who were already 
relatively disadvantaged. Therefore, as we work our way towards a more precise 
characterisation of the idea of predistribution, it will be worth making a stipulation that 
what we have in mind is not merely predistribution in the formal sense – under which 
the government of Reagan and Thatcher in the US and UK could count as striking 
examples of effective predistributive public policy – but a more substantive idea of 
predistribution that involves the pursuit of broadly progressive or egalitarian goals. 
Obviously there could be different ways of spelling out the precise nature of those 
goals, and this is something to which we’ll return later in this discussion. Hacker offers 
one example in talking about “economic and social gains for citizens across the income 
distribution”, which one might see as a fairly minimalist characterisation of a 
progressive aim, leaving open the space for more ambitious rival views. But the main 
stipulation is that, in talking about predistribution from here on, it will be the 
substantive idea of a broadly progressive or egalitarian form of predistribution that will 
be in view, rather than the kind of merely formal idea of predistribution under which the 
regressive policies of our Ukanian example would qualify as a case of predistribution 
par excellence. This stipulation is driven by the nature of the investigation at hand: the 
fact that we’re starting from a really-existing debate among advocates of a more 
progressive or egalitarian economic settlement, and that it is from that debate that the 
idea of predistribution has emerged. 
 
To return to our provisional characterisation, making use of Hacker’s revised definition 
and pre-empting the problem of merely formal forms of predistribution, we can define 
predistributive policies as those that pursue progressive or egalitarian ends (however 
precisely those are to be characterised) by means of government action distinct from 
taxing and providing benefits. This position certainly on the face of it seems clear and 
determinate. But I want to suggest that things get much more complicated as soon as we 
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try to investigate the question of whether there is really an important distinction in kind 
between government action that involves taxation and spending, and government action 
that involves distinct mechanisms that shape markets and the location of power within 
those markets. The potential problem for our provisional position here is that there is a 
danger that the category of predistributive policies – and hence the idea of 
predistribution itself – may end up relying on a distinction without a real underlying 
difference. It is to this question that we shall now turn. 
 
 
4.! The Plot Thickens: the Predistributive Function of Public Services 
For a paradigm case of predistribution, let’s return to our semi-imaginary Ukania, and 
imagine the accession to power in that country of a new government which is resolutely 
sympathetic to labour unions and enacts a number of measures to increase union 
density, to make industrial action easier, and to embed the role of unions in sectoral pay 
bargaining, on something of the model of codetermination or Mitbestimmung as we see 
in models of Rhenish capitalism.26 Let us imagine, as is likely, that these reforms 
greatly increase the bargaining power of labour relative to capital. In James K. 
Galbraith’s terms, such reforms would grant ordinary workers a form of “countervailing 
power” with regard to their employers.27 The predictable consequences of such reforms, 
other things being equal, would be that labour would be able to claim more of the 
division of the social surplus, the gap in wages between ordinary workers and their 
bosses would reduce, and inequality would go down. Thus we have here a clear 
paradigm case of predistributive public policy (in the full substantive sense). 
 
Nevertheless, if we’re interested in what governments do to shape markets, and to 
change the balance of bargaining power between different groups or classes within the 
economy, then that does not give us a special category of action that’s distinct from 
taxation and public spending, but seems to include it, in particular when we think about 
redistribution through the provision of public services. Consider a different example, 
 
26 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, (Oxford University Press, 2001); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century, (Harvard University Press, 2014), 140-46. 
27 J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, (Houghton Mifflin, 
1952). 
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where the provision of public services also changes the relevant power dynamics 
between workers and employers. Let’s call this example the Case of USania. 
 
The Case of USania 
Imagine a society in which healthcare benefits are provided in a haphazard way by an 
inefficient system of private insurance, with many people’s access to even a minimally 
decent level of healthcare provision being tied to their employment status. Imagine that 
in such a society, against all previous expectations, a democratic socialist candidate is 
elected to the presidency, and that one of his or her first policy priorities is to create a 
national health system that ensures that all workers have access to an excellent level of 
universally available healthcare, provided free at the point of use through direct public 
provision, funded by general taxation. What would be the implications enacting this 
kind of policy? Well, obviously something would have to happen to the tax system in 
order to fund this new system, and the new system would bring benefits to many 
individuals who were comparatively disadvantaged by the previous system. No doubt 
there would be some general efficiency gains in moving from a splintered private 
market to a coherent public system of healthcare provision, and so there would be a 
certain amount of ‘levelling up’, and the removal of the deadweight loss associated with 
the rent-seeking private bureaucracies associated with the previous system. What there 
would also be, in terms of direct effects, would be a de facto economic transfer from 
those who were especially advantaged by the old system (e.g. by the unreasonable 
suppression of top rates of taxation) towards those relatively disadvantaged individuals 
who would be most advantaged by the new system.  
 
But something else would happen as well, which would directly parallel what would 
happen when Ukania moved towards a more Rhenish or Nordic model of employment 
relationships. The bargaining power of labour would go up. When workers’ access to 
healthcare depended directly on their employment status, and where employers had a 
role as gatekeepers in terms of access to more adequate and attractive health insurance 
plans, workers obviously had a direct incentive against ‘rocking the boat’ in their 
workplace, given that the effective costs of even a short period of unemployment could 
be so high. By contrast, after the enactment of our imagined National Health Service – 
or Medicare for All – in USania, the costs of exiting from a bad employment 
relationship would be much lower for workers, and hence their bargaining power 
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against their employers would go up, in much the same kind of way as if a change had 
been made more directly to the regulation of that employment relationship.  
 
The tax-funded provision of public services is not of interest to progressives or 
egalitarians only because it is directly a way of benefitting everyone at a cost that falls 
disproportionately on those who have more, but also because of second-round effects 
that the provision of public services can have in terms of the structure and distribution 
of power in economic relationships within that society. The public provision of services 
such as healthcare, education, and childcare, or even provision of goods such as public 
transportation and public parks,28 creates the background conditions against which 
different groups and different sectional interests fight their corner and negotiate their 
economic relationships. Public provision is not just a way of undertaking a transfer 
against the backdrop of a market with a particular kind of shape and structure, it is also 
at the same time a means of shaping markets, and changing the relative bargaining 
power of different groups of market actors. Therefore, if predistribution is centrally 
about the role of government in what we might call “market-shaping”, then there is not 
a relevant contrast to be drawn with a different kind of activity (imagined presumably as 
purely redistributive) that government undertakes when it goes in for the provision of 
public services funded by taxation. Public service provision is in general both about 
transferring benefits, per se, but also about shaping the background within which market 
transactions take place, and therefore it is misleading rather than illuminating to draw a 
sharp contrast, at the levels of types of policy, between policies that have a 
redistributive role and those that have a ‘market-shaping’ role. 
 
A pessimistic diagnosis at this point is that the idea of predistribution as presented in 
Hacker’s revised and more promising formulation ends up trading on a merely shallow 
distinction between different kinds of government action. If it turns out that precisely 
what is interesting about the predistributive effects of changes in labour regulation can 
also be seen at work in classically ‘redistributive’ provision of public services, then we 
apparently do not have a way of dividing government policies that affect economic 
 
28 Joshua Cohen, ‘On Central Park’, Gilded Birds, 2 January 2013, available at 
<https://gildedbirds.com/2013/01/02/joshua-cohen/>; Bonnie Honig, Public Things: Democracy in 
Disrepair (Fordham University Press, 2017). See also the Labour Party Report, Universal Basic Services: 
The Right to a Good Life, (Labour Party, 2019), available at < 
http://www.labour.org.uk/universalbasicservices/>. 
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outcomes neatly into the two categories of ‘redistribution’ and ‘predistribution’. 
Advocates of predistribution as the proper zone of focus for progressive or egalitarian 
politics, in distinction to the previous focus on redistribution, might therefore be seen as 
relying upon a superficial conceptual distinction that does not illuminate a deeper 
contrast in how policies function.  
 
 
5.! Power, Public Services, and a Pluralist Account of Predistribution 
Stepping back from the characterisation of predistribution that has been found wanting, 
we should note that Jacob Hacker is, of course, fully aware of the market-shaping and 
power-rebalancing effects of public service provision, and does not fall into the trap of 
seeing such policies in purely redistributive terms, without being aware of their more 
‘predistributive’ function. In another presentation of the core idea of predistribution, 
presented in a BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme on the subject, Hacker pursues the 
thought (which seems to have some intellectual kinship with the thinking of both 
Michael Walzer and T. H. Marshall29) that the provision of certain important public 
services will be valuable precisely for the reason that such provision will reduce the 
salience and significance of market inequalities. Here, then, is this third account of the 
idea of predistribution: 
 
“You have to ask what are the central ways in which government can stand on the side 
of ordinary workers that do not involve taxing and providing benefits, and I would say 
that there are three. One, it means getting the macro economy right. When we’re closer 
to full employment as an economy … we tend to get stronger wage growth across the 
board. It also means making sure that even if inequality’s growing in the market, it 
matters less in terms of some vital public services - things like healthcare, childcare. 
And, finally, it means - and this is the hardest part - it means trying to make sure that in 
an era in which organised labour is weaker that labour still has a voice and a place. And 
whether that’s supporting living wage campaigns, whether that means providing new 
opportunities for workers to have a voice outside of unions, whether it means if we 
privatise public services or contract out and allow all these low wage jobs to proliferate 
in and around the public sector, we’re making our job much, much harder.”30 (my 
italics) 
 
 
29 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, (Basic Books, 1984); T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1950). 
30 BBC Analysis, ‘Predistribution’, 17 June 2013. Transcript available at: 
<http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/20130620-analysis-predistribution.pdf>  
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Here we have a more complicated or pluralist conception of what is meant by 
predistribution. I take it that the idea of “getting the macroeconomy right” and avoiding 
the kind of contractionary austerity associated with UK economic policy in the years 
following the 2008 financial crisis, is uncontroversial common ground between the 
advocates of different varieties of progressive political economy, whether self-avowedly 
‘redistributive’ or ‘predistributive’ in character. The more interesting elements are the 
second and third. The idea of making sure “that labour still has a voice and a place” 
looks like a canonical case of predistributive market-shaping, in ensuring, as in our 
Ukanian example above, that the organised power of labour can be a source of 
Galbraithian countervailing power within the economy. Let’s call this ‘labour 
predistribution’, which I now take to be an unproblematic dimension of the idea of 
predistribution.  
 
The most interesting case, though, is the middle one, which, rather than being a classic 
case of ‘labour predistribution’, sees the provision of public services as a central plank 
of predistributive public policy. What is worth noting about such policies is that the 
predistributive dimension of public service provision has a dual aspect. On the one 
hand, as in cases like our imagined USanian health service, public service provision 
changes the distribution of power within market interactions between employers and 
employees. But on the other hand, as Hacker points out, such public service provision, 
by straightforwardly making individuals less reliant on their market income to provide 
for the vital necessities of life, also simply reduces the salience and significance of 
market inequalities. Obviously these two effects are related to one another in how they 
function, but it is worth keeping them analytically distinct. The very same policies can 
be attractive to progressives and egalitarians both because they reallocate market power, 
changing the terms on which market transactions take place so as to make them more 
egalitarian in their outcomes, and also because they reduce the importance of market 
incomes for individuals who can also rely on non-market social entitlements. The first 
aspect is shared with central cases of ‘labour predistribution’, whereas the second 
element – lessening individuals’ reliance on the labour market considered as valuable 
not merely because this will increase individuals’ bargaining power within the labour 
market – is a distinctive variety of predistribution which could not be enacted by labour 
predistribution alone. 
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Where does this leave us? On the one hand, it is important to have a clear sense of the 
significance this dual aspect of predistribution, and of the non-derivative value of 
increasing workers’ power, and lessening their vulnerability, within the labour market. 
This shows why it would not be plausible to circumscribe the ambit of predistributive 
policies so as to exclude predistributive tax-and-benefit policies. On the other hand, this 
seems to lead us back into our earlier conceptual difficulties, unable to identify a 
coherent specific category of predistributive policies, held distinct from their 
redistributive alternatives.  
 
 
6.! The Predistributive Role of Taxation and Cash Transfers 
Before adjudicating on this conceptual issue, I want first to consider a potentially 
enlightening final proposal, which takes seriously the implications of the predistributive 
role of public services. The proposal is that where we should draw the distinction 
between predistribution and redistribution is that, whereas the former includes both 
market-shaping regulations and the provision of public services (which both increase 
workers’ bargaining power in their labour market transactions and reduce workers’ 
reliance on those transactions), it excludes the kinds of pure case of fiscal tax-and-
transfer that are an essential element of regimes of redistribution. The case for 
progressives favouring predistribution over redistribution could then be recast as a case 
in favour of pursuing a combined strategy of market regulation and the provision of in-
kind benefits, as opposed to pursing simple cash transfers. To assess this proposal, I 
want to take one clear and unambiguous example of a policy of redistributive cash 
transfer, and one clear example of a policy of altering top-rate income taxation. Even 
for such pure cases of tax-and-transfer, I will argue that on further investigation both 
have a dimension that is best understood as ‘predistributive’, such that neither policy 
can be fully understood in purely redistributive terms. I’ll take the cases in turn. 
 
(a)!The Predistributive Case for Universal Basic Income 
There could be no policy that fits more centrally under the description of redistribution 
than a tax-funded cash transfer, of the kind that would be paid unconditionally under 
proposals for an unconditional universal basic income (UBI). Such policies can be 
justified in different ways, by means of appeal to different foundational normative 
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principles.31 But it is striking that some plausible justifications for such a 
paradigmatically redistributive policy depend precisely on the twin ‘predistributive’ 
effects that such redistributive policies can have. The individual in receipt of a 
(relatively high) unconditional basic income is, by virtue of receiving that income, 
likely (a) to have more bargaining power in the labour market than she would otherwise 
have, and (b) to be less reliant on how she fares in the labour market, and hence less 
vulnerable to market outcomes. 
 
Karl Widerquist, a leading defender of UBI policies, in his book Independence, 
Propertylessness and Basic Income, justifies UBI on broadly republican grounds, in 
terms of its giving individuals “freedom as the power to say ‘no’”.32 Whilst this does 
not preclude UBI having other sources of possible egalitarian justification, perhaps 
more closely aligned with its directly redistributive character, this form of republican 
defence of UBI turns on its ‘second-round’ predistributive dimension. The recipient of a 
(relatively high) UBI will find herself more robustly secure outside of how she fares in 
the labour market, which may be non-derivatively valuable to her as well as being 
derivatively valuable in terms of this granting her greater power as an actor within the 
labour market. Where UBI is universal, and all workers are similarly situated, the 
bargaining power of labour over capital will increase, just in the same way as in 
canonical cases of ‘labour predistribution’. And so here even the purest case of a 
redistributive policy can find justification on predistributive grounds. 
 
(b)!Predistribution and Top-Rate Income Tax:  
the Piketty-Saez-Stantcheva Effect  
It is also significant that the justification of some forms of taxation can turn not on the 
role of those taxes in raising revenue for the fiscal authorities, but simply on their 
paradigmatically ‘predistributive’ effects in terms of the market bargaining-power of the 
best paid. This may seem surprising at first sight, given that so much of public and even 
academic discussion of top marginal tax rates proceeds with the unarticulated 
assumption that the primary function of such taxes is in their ‘first-round’ effects in 
revenue raising, hence embroiling us immediately in the over-simplified and rather 
 
31 See Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free 
Society and a Sane Economy (Harvard University Press, 2017), Ch. 5. 
32 Karl Widerquist, Independence, Propertylessness and Basic Income: A Theory of Freedom as the 
Power to Say No, (Palgrave, 2013). 
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short-sighted discussion of the shape of the relevant Laffer curves, and our current 
position with respect to them. But the indirect effects of tax are often just as important, 
including those that work through effects on the allocation of bargaining power. 
 
This will be clearer if we consider what we can call the Piketty-Saez-Stantcheva effect 
of changes in top marginal rates of income taxation. In their modelling of top rates, 
Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva find that the determination of top rates of pay is not best 
understood in terms of standard marginal productivity theory. This is not only because 
of the formidable epistemic barriers to determining what the marginal contribution of 
corporate managers or other very highly paid workers actually is, at least outside of 
specific domains such as the entertainment industry or professional sport,33 but also 
because more can be explained in terms of a ‘bargaining model’ of top pay.34 In short, 
senior managers get what they can bargain their way to getting, given the behaviour of 
others and the prevailing social norms. When top marginal rates of income taxation are 
very high, with a comparatively large gap between gross and net pay at the top end of 
the distribution, highly paid workers will be less likely to focus on the extrinsic 
financial rewards of their positions, and focus more on the intrinsic rewards of prestige 
and authority in large organisations; conversely, when top marginal rates of taxation are 
lowered, and the gap between gross and net pay at the top end of the distribution falls, 
we see a phenomenon where competitive bargaining focuses much more on pay rates 
per se, thereby driving up the costs to companies of their senior managers.35  
 
Hence, we get the Piketty-Saez-Stantcheva effect, whereby decreases in top marginal 
rates of taxation drive up not just net rates of top pay, but much more significantly such 
tax changes greatly drive up gross (pre-tax) levels of top pay as well. This is due to the 
ways in which these tax changes transform the bargaining situations in which top pay is 
determined, both in terms of the incentives held by the highly paid themselves, and in 
terms of background effects on social norms. What we have here, then, is another case 
 
33 As Thomas Piketty rather charmingly puts it in Capital in the Twenty-First Century, “the theory of 
marginal productivity runs into serious conceptual and economic difficulties (in addition to suffering 
from a certain naïveté) when it comes to explaining how pay is determined at the top of the income 
hierarchy.” (Piketty op. cit., 509) 
34 See Thomas Piketty, Emmauel Saez and Stefanie Stantcheva, ‘Optimal Taxation of Top Labor 
Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (1), 2014, 230-
71. 
35 Piketty op. cit., 510. 
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of a putatively pure ‘redistributive’ policy mechanism having significant effects through 
what we might think of as typically ‘predistributive’ mechanisms. This is, so to speak, 
the obverse of what happens in the basic income case, where a cash transfer can drive 
up bargaining power; what we have here is the possibility that the imposition of a 
higher marginal rate of income tax would be significant not so much for its direct 
revenue-raising effects, but because it would significantly reduce the de facto 
bargaining power of senior and already well-remunerated managers. A classic instance 
of redistributive economic policy would turn out, via the best available understanding of 
the behaviour of the labour market, to be a paradigm case of ‘labour predistribution’, in 
which the balance of bargaining power in the labour market would be changed, 
reducing the existing advantages of the small cadre of super-managers and others at the 
very top end of the distribution of labour income. 
 
Progressives and egalitarians may therefore have very good reasons to champion a 
significant increase in top rate marginal income taxation, but not only or even mainly 
for the standard revenue-raising reasons that are typically invoked in the justification of 
higher taxes on top earnings. As Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva put it, “the optimal top 
tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects.”36 This 
point about the existence of zero-sum bargaining effects is of great importance, but is 
often overlooked. As Paul Segal points out, there is a very important, if often 
unacknowledged, way in which we collectively have an interest in keeping down top 
pay, not out of envy, or even for intrinsically egalitarian reasons, but simply because 
“one way or another, the rest of us have to pay for those incomes: as workers, higher 
pay at the top means our salaries have to be lower; or as consumers, it raises the prices 
we face; or as pension-holders, it lowers share prices and profits that fund our 
retirement.”37  
 
Hence, we return here in a different way to a version of the fundamental point about 
taxes made by Murphy and Nagel. Taxes are not some external intrusion into an 
independently operating economic system, but a constitutive part of the rules of that 
 
36 Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva, op. cit., 230.  
37 Paul Segal, ‘The Problem of Riches’, Renewal, 22 (3/4) (2014), 135-143, at 141. As Segal continues: 
“Again, since the evidence shows that excessive pay at the top does not increase the size of the pie, their 
ever-growing slice comes at everyone else’s expense, and trimming it would leave more for the rest of 
us.” 
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game; and the structure of the tax system, just as much as the structure of labour law or 
the array of provision of public services, affects and conditions the relative bargaining 
powers and positions of different groups and classes of agents within that system. 
 
 
7.! The Collapse of the Distinction between Redistribution and 
Predistribution? 
Our conceptual conclusion, then, is that even this much-revised characterisation of 
predistribution fails to pick out a distinct type of policy. Or, to put things in a different 
way, if we were stipulatively to decide that predistribution should be understood as 
marking out a class of policies that particularly exclude canonically redistributive tax-
and-transfer policies, then we would end up with a category of policies without any 
underlying coherence at the level of justification, and without any real conceptual or 
normative interest. There is no interesting or deep distinction at the level of types of 
policy, as regards the distinction between redistribution and predistribution, given that 
(a) many policies have both redistributive and predistributive consequences, and (b) 
even the narrow class of pristinely ‘redistributive’ policies, against which the idea of 
predistribution was characterized by Hacker and others, can themselves have 
predistributive effects. There is simply no such thing as two distinct categories of 
policy, one marked redistribution and one marked predistribution. 
 
Does this mean that we have simply been on a wild goose chase in thinking through the 
idea of predistribution, seen as an alternative to traditional forms of redistribution? 
Thankfully this is not the case.  What we have shown is that, insofar as there is an 
important distinction here, it has to be with regard to the aims and effects of policy, 
rather than in terms of the nature of the policy tools or mechanisms that are used. The 
content of these policy aims and effects has already been touched upon above, in 
imagining the new USanian healthcare or Medicare service, and its potential twin roles 
in both reducing objectionable inequalities of power within market relationships, and 
giving individuals a secure standing outside of the market transactions in which they 
may otherwise be potentially vulnerable to a troubling degree. To get a clearer sense of 
these predistributive policy aims, I want very briefly to revisit a thinker whom one can 
see as a highly significant theorist of predistribution avant la lettre: the Nobel Prize 
winning economist James Meade. In seeing what was at stake Meade’s critique of 
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redistribution, we can hope to get a clear fix on what is at stake between advocates of 
predistribution and redistribution, now reconceived as aims or objectives of policy, 
rather than as distinct kinds of policy. 
 
 
8.! The Pre-History of Predistribution: James Meade on the Twin Aims of 
Predistribution 
In his important 1964 book, Efficiency, Equality, and the Ownership of Property, James 
Meade advanced a compelling account of how wealth should be treated by institutions 
tasked with creating a more egalitarian economy.38 This work has been influential both 
on political philosophers – especially in John Rawls’s ideas of a “property-owing 
democracy” – and on Meade’s fellow economists, in particular through the work of 
Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty, the latter of whom describes his own work as 
“following in the footsteps” of Atkinson and Meade.39  
 
Meade is an interesting figure in the development of thinking about predistribution not 
least because he was in fact sceptical about the central form of ‘labour predistribution’ 
that would be involved in bidding-up the bargaining power of labour unions through 
having politically stronger unions – what he described as enacting a “Trade Union 
State”. His argument was that the costs in overall aggregate economic efficiency of 
bidding up the price of wages were unjustifiable, and hence an egalitarian economy 
would have to be sought by some other means.40 His alternative to ‘labour 
predistribution’ was to change the character of the overall economic distribution, and 
therefore also the social relationships and distribution of power to which it would give 
rise, via mechanisms of what we might call ‘capital predistribution’. He saw the role of 
the state not in merely ameliorating the poverty of those who did not inherit any of 
society’s wealth, but in making sure that all citizens within a society would benefit from 
capital returns. This ‘capital predistribution’ would be achieved by a mixture of private 
 
38 J. E. Meade, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, (George Allen & Unwin, 1964),  
39 Piketty op. cit., 582. See also Martin O’Neill, ‘Philosophy and Public Policy after Piketty’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 25.3 (2017), 343-375, esp. 361-5; Martin O’Neill, ‘James Meade and 
Predistribution: 50 Years Before his Time’, Policy Network: Classics of Social Democratic Thought, 
2015, available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170312125656/http://www.policy-
network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4909&title=James-Meade-and-predistribution-50-years-before-his-
time>.  
40 Meade, op. cit., 35-7.  
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means – the creation of “a property-owning democracy” in Meade’s terms – operating 
simultaneously alongside a “socialist state” that would expand the collective, public 
ownership of capital through institutions akin to contemporary sovereign wealth funds 
(or, as Meade put it “a national asset” or “Citizens’ Trust”). Meade described the 
combination of these public and private forms of capital predistribution as together 
bringing about a form of “liberal socialism”.41 
 
In terms of getting to the normative heart of the predistributive ideal, though, what is 
most striking in Meade’s book is not so much the detail of his institutional proposals for 
‘capital predistribution’, as the content of his critique of existing forms of welfare state 
redistribution. He did not for a moment think that redistribution was unnecessary, or 
that predistributive measures should entirely replace traditional tax-and-spend or tax-
and-transfer policies, but his worries about the limits of the familiar mid-twentieth 
century welfare state are powerfully expressed, and make a clear case for why it is that a 
concern only for the distribution of income cannot be sufficient to create an egalitarian 
economic settlement, and why ‘capital predistribution’ must be a necessary element of a 
just institutional structure. Here is the key passage: 
 
“Extreme inequalities in the ownership of property are in my view undesirable, quite 
apart from any inequalities of income which they may imply. A man with much 
property has great bargaining strength and a great sense of security, independence and 
freedom; and he enjoys these things not only vis-à-vis his propertyless fellow citizens 
but also vis-à-vis the public authorities. He can snap his fingers at those on whom he 
must rely for an income; for he can always live for a time on his capital. The 
propertyless man must continuously and without interruption acquire his income by 
working for an employer or by qualifying to receive it from a public authority. An 
unequal distribution of property means an unequal distribution of power and status even 
if it is prevented from causing too unequal a distribution of income.”42 
 
The predistributive ideal involves seeing that individuals who sell their labour within 
the market need to be given (a) more equal bargaining power within the labour market, 
and (b) greater security, independence and freedom outside the labour market. 
 
41 Meade, op. cit., 40-76. See also Martin O’Neill and Stuart White, ‘James Meade, Public Ownership, 
and the Idea of a Citizens’ Trust’, International Journal of Public Policy, 15 (1-2), 2019, 21-37. Anthony 
Atkinson, in his final book Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Harvard University Press, 2015), advocates 
a suite of egalitarian policies, including forms of ‘capital predistribution’ and the creation of a public 
‘Investment Authority’, operating as a sovereign wealth fund, that can be read as an updated development 
of Meade’s pluralist egalitarian policy strategy. (Atkinson remarked to me that he wrote his book 
“with a copy of James’s book in front of me” (personal correspondence, 4 January 2016)). 
42 Meade op. cit., 38-9. 
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Significantly, these goods have to be secured against both other people and against the 
state. And ultimately these goals are best understood with regard to our underlying 
egalitarian interest in social relations of status and power. 
 
 
9.! Conclusion: Power, Predistribution, and Social Justice 
Predistribution is, one might say, the name for the broad set of egalitarian economic 
policies justified by a conception of egalitarian commitment that goes beyond a concern 
only with the distribution of goods and money, but which is centrally concerned with 
status and power in economic outcomes. There is, then, a clear sense in which the idea 
of predistribution has an internal connection to ideas of social egalitarianism, projected 
into the economic domain, embodying the ambition to think about economic policy in a 
way that goes beyond what Iris Marion Young has called ‘the distributive paradigm’.43 
The point of predistributive policies is to shape the character of economic relationships, 
seen as sites for the exercise of power, and this therefore runs beyond a concern only 
with final distributive results. The twin egalitarian aims of such policies are dispersing 
power within markets, and making individuals less dependent on market outcomes in 
the first place. These twin aims are closely related, and can often be achieved together. 
 
It is a familiar objection directed at advocates of a political focus on predistribution, that 
even effective policies of predistribution would not eradicate the need for forms of 
redistribution, both in the form of direct cash transfers, and in the form of indirect 
transfer through the provision of public services funded through taxation. Obviously, 
the advocate of predistribution should have no argument with this objection, not least 
because, as we have seen in sections 4-6 above, such redistributive policies frequently 
have a distinctively predistributive justification. Moving away from the Hacker-type 
view that sees predistribution as a kind of policy as opposed to a kind of aim or goal, or 
valuable effect, helps to forestall this kind of unilluminating disagreement between 
advocates of predistribution and their opponents. Moreover, it should be no part of 
advocating predistributive public policies to think that there might not also be a 
justification for transfers or public service provision that was based on purely 
 
43 See Martin O’Neill, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’ Philosophy & Public Affairs, 36.2, 2008, 
119-56. On the idea of the “distributive paradigm”, see Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, 2nd edition, (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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redistributive considerations – i.e. because one person or group is in need, or suffering 
some absolute level of privation, and the transfer from a relatively advantaged person or 
group would rectify this. After all, our concerns as egalitarians are complex, combining 
consideration of both how well each individual fares, and of the nature of the social 
relations between individuals.44 There may also be cases where purely redistributive 
aims could be most efficiently enacted by means of the kinds of policy mechanisms 
associated with predistribution. In many cases, the same policies might be favoured by 
progressives and egalitarians for both their redistributive and predistributive effects, 
operating at once but by means of distinct mechanisms. None of these cases would 
constitute an objection to either our characterisation of the idea of predistribution, or to 
the claim that progressive or egalitarian politics should treat predistribution as a central 
priority. 
 
Some of the political attraction of predistribution to centre-left parties and politicians 
during the 2010s has rested on the fact it looked like the route to a social democratic 
strategy for an age of austerity, in which government spending was to be severely 
curtailed. But taking seriously the state’s role in shaping markets, or in accentuating the 
power of the disadvantaged, is not, as we’ve seen, something that can be done in 
isolation from thinking about the role of public services, or the role of the tax system. 
So the hope that a commitment to predistribution might be an egalitarian strategy “on 
the cheap”, or one which could somehow be pursued without political conflict with 
existing economic interests, is obviously an illusory one. This might also be thought to 
be a point that stands against Hacker’s “instrumental” defence of the focus on 
predistribution – that is, against the hope that the pursuit of egalitarian strategies that did 
not involve standard forms of redistribution might be achieved without whipping up the 
usual kinds of reactionary political backlash that might be expected to be faced by 
projects of egalitarian transformation in the economy. 
 
What we have seen in the foregoing discussion is that there is unlikely to be a way of 
achieving the aims of predistribution without significant changes both to labour 
regulation and to the fiscal system, involving in particular changes to the taxation of 
wealth and inheritance. Such measures are unlikely to be uncontroversial, or free from 
 
44 Scanlon, op. cit.; O’Neill, op. cit. 
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political backlash, even if it is also true that some forms of predistributive public policy 
could, if skilfully designed, be more likely, at least in some places and in some times, to 
fly under the ‘political radar’ of anti-progressive or anti-egalitarian political forces.  
 
Predistribution is a capacious idea. One might say that it is the name for a problem in 
egalitarian public policy: that is, how can we create an economy without objectionable 
inequalities in bargaining power, in which the status, standing and self-respect of each is 
protected?  It is not the name for any particular solution to this pressing and difficult 
problem. Nevertheless, by taking seriously the idea of predistribution we open up an 
important agenda for thinking about egalitarian public policy, and pursing the twin aims 
of equalizing market power and making individuals’ life chances less dependent on 
market outcomes. Such an agenda emphasises the point that the character of economic 
relationships should be at the core of our thinking about social justice. For political 
philosophers, one central lesson is that, whereas the discipline has often thought a great 
deal about the assessment of distributive outcomes, developing a cornucopia of 
principles for the normative assessment of all-things-considered final distributions, we 
need to think more about the detailed structure and texture of economic policy, and to 
give more consideration and attention to social consequences both of particular policies 
and institutions, and to the interactions between them. We have an urgent collective 
goal in thinking not just about the distributive outcomes the economy produces, but in 
thinking more about the particular ways in which the economy can be shaped to 
disempower the privileged and to empower the disadvantaged. 
 
